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COMMENTS
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR -INTENTIONAL TORTS AS
BEING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
It is possible for a defendant to become liable in an action at law in
two ways, the first being by virtue of his own acts or omissions and
the second by virtue of the relationship in which he has placed himself.
A master may be subject to liability for the acts of his servant in both
or either of these respects.'
A master may subject himself to liability based upon his own acts
or omissions in several ways:
1. The master may be liable to third persons due to his negli-
gence in the selection of his servant. This case arises when
the particular servant is unfit or incompetent to perform the
duties for which he was employed, especially if such duties
require special skill or training.2
2. The master may be liable to third persons for his negligence
in failing to instruct his servants as to the proper method for
performing the work.3
3. The master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
where the act is done under his express instruction or under
circumstances indicating an acquiescence by the master.4
4. The master may be liable due to his acquiescence in previous
similar tortious acts of his servant, although outside the scope
of the servant's employment.5
5. The master is subject to liability when he ratifies the tortious
act of his servant."
The master's liability may also be based upon his participation
in the master-servant relationship itself. This liability results from
what is known as the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this
doctrine, a master is liable for injury to person or property resulting
from the acts of his servant done within the scope of his employment
in the master's service.' The doctrine seems to have been founded
on public policy, its purpose being to allocate to the business the risks
normally attendant thereto."
It can be observed from the statement of the doctrine that there
are two major requirements which must be met before it will apply.
First, a true master and servant relationship must obtain in order
that the master may be properly charged with the servant's act as his
own. 9 Second, the tortious act of the servant must be done within
139 C. J., MASTER AND SERVANT, §1446-1451.
2 Holladay v. Kennard, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 254, 20 L.Ed. 390 (1870).
3 Penas v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.. 112 Minn. 203, 127 N.W. 926 (1910).
4 Barden v. Felch, 109 Mass. 154 (1872).
5 Fletcher v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 168 U.S. 135, 18 S.Ct. 35 (1897).
6Lee v. Lord, 76 Wis. 582, 45 N.W. 601 (1890).
7 Ratcliffe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 153 Wis. 281, 141 N.W. 229 (1913).
8 Mechem, OUTLINES OF THE LAWv OF AGENCY, §359.
9 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 26 L.Ed. 141 (1880).
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the scope of his employment.10 The scope of employment concept is
not susceptible to minute delineation or definition. In general it can
be said that those acts done with the express or implied authority of
the master are within the scope of employment of the servant.1 ' Acts
which are done by the servant by virtue of his employment and in
furtherance of its ends are deemed to be done within the scope of
employment.1
2
It is well established that liability under the doctrine will result
from the negligent acts of the servant.'3 However, courts were re-
luctant to apply the doctrine to the wilful acts of the servant, although
done within the scope of the servant's employment, unless the master
had expressly authorized or assented to such acts.' 4 It seems to be
generally conceded at this time, however, that the master is liable for
the wilful and malicious acts of his servant if performed within the
scope of his employment.' 5 Such liability is also predicated on the
doctrine of respondeat superior.'6 The Michigan court refused to
adopt the modern rule in the Ducre case,' 7 denominating it as "an
extreme which this court is not willing to follow." In that particular
case the court denied recovery against the defendant whose clerk had
assaulted the plaintiff, who had provoked the attack by using obscene
language in the defendant's store.
With these basic principles in mind, it is the purpose of this dis-
cussion to review the construction which the courts have put on the
scope of employment requirement in the area of intentional torts.
The courts look with disfavor or at least slight trepidation upon
the decisions setting up scope of employment as the prime requisite.
Although still adhering to the older rule, the New York courts held
that even if scope of employment were the only consideration, a wilful
tort is deemed by the law to be a stepping aside from the course of
employment.' The Texas court held that a wilful tort was prima
facie evidence of an act done outside the scope and authority of the
servant's employment.' 9 These courts seemed to think that public
policy would be better served by refusing to allow recovery against the
master when, due to the intentional nature of the tortious act involved,
the master had so little of the element of control inherent in the master-
servant relationship.
10 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Schreiber, 150 Wis. 42, 135 N.W. 507 (1912).
11 Gerstein v. C. F. Adams Co., 169 Wis. 504, 173 N.W. 209 (1919).
12 Hinlde v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (Mo.) 199 S.W. 227 (1917).
1" Blumenfeld v. Meyer-Schmid Grocery Co., 206 Mo. A. 509, 230 S.W. 132 (1921).
'
4 Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 343 (1838).
15 39 C. T., MASTER AND SERVANT, §1487.
16 Marx v. Ontario Beach Hotel, etc., Co., 211 N.Y. 33, 105 N.E. 97 (1914).
1 Ducre v. Sparrow-Kroll Lumber Co., 168 Mich. 49, 133 N.W. 938 (1911).
18 Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend (N.Y.) 343 (1838).
'9 Gulf, C., and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Reed, 80 Tex. 362, 115 S.W. 1105 (1891).
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Some jurisdictions, although committed to the rule that the master
is liable for wilful torts within the scope of the employment, have
maintained a strict attitude and refused to consider a wilful tort as
generally being within the scope of employment. In a recent Oregon
case, the defendant railroad company had employed a servant to re-
move obstructions from its right of way. The servant attempted to
put out a fire built by the plaintiff near the defendant's bunkhouse.
An argument ensued which was abruptly concluded when the servant
struck the plaintiff across the head with a shovel. The court, in holding
that the defendant company was entitled to a directed verdict, said:
"Faherty was serving no purpose of the defendant, real or im-
plied, in engaging in the argument. The injury arose out of the
argument, not out of anything Faherty was doing in the interests
of his master."20
Under this strict construction of the scope of employment require-
ment, it appears that the tortious act of the servant must somehow
be furthering the master's business. It follows that in such jurisdic-
tions, a master is generally not subject to liability for the wilful torts
of a servant. There is, however, one exception which appears to cover
most of the cases in which the mastef's business would be served'by
a wilfully tortious act. This occurs when the nature of the particular
employment authorizes the use or performance of tortious acts. The
usual example of this type of employment is found in those cases in
which the service to be rendered impliedly necessitates, authorizes, or
at least anticipates the use of force.21 In such cases, the master may be
liable to a third person for the assault and battery of his servant when
such servant uses excessive force or uses any force against a thii'd
person without a right to do So. 2 2
This situation approximates an actual authorization, but the courts
have held the master liable on the theory that the authorization arose
from the employment rather than from the employer. The authority
is considered as implied from the nature of the employment.23
An example of this type of employment is found in the cases of
night watchmen, doormen, and detectives. The master is subject to
liability for the assaults of such servants, at least while they are per-
forming their duties.2 4
Another example of this type of employment is found in the cases
of servants hired to retake the master's property from third persons.
In such cases, the master is also subject to liability for excessive or
unwarranted force.2 5
20 Barry v. Oregon Trunk Ry., 197 Ore. 246, 253 P.2d 260 (1953).
21 39 C. ., MASTER AND SERVANT, §1506.22 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 7 S.Ct. 1286 (1887).
23 Rogahn v. Moore Mfg., etc. Co., 79 Wis. 573, 48 N.W. 669 (1891).
24 Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N.E. 506 (1893).25 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 7 S.Ct. 1286 (1887).
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Some cases have held that, when a servant is employed to collect
money due the master, an assault committed on a third person renders
the master subject to liability.2 6
It can be deduced from these decisions that, in jurisdictions ad-
hering to a strict construction of the scope of employment requirement,
the master is not subject to liability for the intentional or wilful torts
of his servant unless he can be held for his own acts or omissions,
such as ratification or assent, or unless the type of employment by its
nature authorizes the commission of such torts.
This classic conception of the master's non-liability for the wilful
torts of his servant has been recently subjected to some sweeping
liberalization. This is illustrated by a recent Georgia case.27 In this
case, the defendant's employee was playing baseball for the defendant's
industrial league team. The plaintiff was searching for a lost child;
and, in so doing, crossed the center field position played by the em-
ployee. The servant ordered the plaintiff to leave, an argument ensued,
and the servant assaulted the plaintiff after the plaintiff had turned
away to leave. In affirming the order overruling the defendant's de-
murrer, the court said the test of liability was not whether the servant
had stepped aside from his employment, but whether the act was so
closely connected to his employment that it could be considered a part
thereof. The court made no mention of whether the employment
authorized the use of force by its nature, but it would seem rather
difficult to stretch these facts to fit this requirement.
The development of this attitude parallels the increasing liberality
of decisions in workman's compensation cases. The rule in such cases
is that the injury must arise from or out of the employment . 2  Courts
have declared, however, that a liberal construction of this requirement
is necessary. 29 The test of employer's liability has, under such liberal
construction been merely the relation of the employment to the risk.30
The courts are of the opinion that the liberalization is just since
it is the duty of the employers to see that the acts authorized by him
are properly performed.-1 This might be better explained by stating
that the acts of a servant are, in effect, the acts of the master at least
in that they would not be performed but for the planning of the master.
This instigation, plus the control inherent in the master-servant rela-
tionship, combine to make the servant's acts constructively those of the
master. It seems then to follow that the master should be responsible
26 Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900).2 7 Minnesota Mining, etc., Co. v. R. L. Ellington, 92 Ga.App. 24, 87 S.E.2d 665
(1955).
28 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 26 C.2d 286 158 P.2d 9
(1945).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Jozwiak v. United States, 123 F.Supp. 65 (1954).
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
in equal degree for his actual and constructive acts. The master would
be liable if he committed an intentional tort while he himself was
doing the act, therefore he should be liable for such torts committed
while he was constructively acting.
It appears to the writer that the basis for the liberalization comes
to rest in the "deeper pockets" doctrine favored in the law today. The
doctrine of respondeat superior was based on public policy,32 which
policy demands an increased application to the intentional tort area.
When this attitude is applied to situations arising out of an assault
and battery by the servant, the courts hold that the dispute out of which
the tort arises must merely be connected with the employment and the
assault must merely grow out of the dispute in order to subject the
master to liability.3 This new trend of thought is opposed to the rule
of the Barry case,3 4 where the court denied recovery to the plaintiff
because the injury arose out of the argument. Under the new attitude,
the fact that the injury arose out of the argument is a factor upon
which liability can be based.
Another striking example of the liberalized interpretation of the
scope of employment requirement is found in a California case.3 5
The court allowed the plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained in the
following manner: The defendant's salesman was driving a company-
owned car home from a night sales meeting. The plaintiff swerved
his car in passing the salesman, forcing him off the road. The salesman
turned his car, pursued the plaintiff, and forced him to pull over and
stop. The salesman then proceeded to assault the plaintiff causing
serious physical injury. The court, in allowing recovery, said that the
servant need have no intent to further the business of the master as
long as the assault grew out of a dispute which arose in the scope of
employment, and that the assault was one of the risks which the
business must bear. 8 It would appear that, although the act of driving
home from such a meeting was within the scope of employment, the
assault after a rather lengthy pursuit was an act entirely apart from
the employment and should have been regarded as a "stepping-aside"
from the service. The salesman stated at the trial that his purpose
was to stop an incompetent driver.37 This would clearly show that
he was not acting for his employer.
The liberalization reached its logical conclusion in a case where
it was held that the servant need not be furthering the master's business
32 Mechem, OUTLINES OF THE LAW oF AGENCY, §359.
33 Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. v. Bryeans, 137 Ark. 341, 209 S.W. 69 (1919);
Tri-State Coach Co. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948).34 Barry v. Oregon Trunk Ry., 197 Ore. 246, 253 P.2d 260 (1953).
35 Pritchard v. Gilbert, 107 C.A.2d 1, 236 P.2d 412 (1951).
U Ibid.
37Ibtd.
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but the master could become liable for the personal animosity of the
servant.38 The only limit recognized in this case, and in most cases,
arises when the employee completely abandons his employment at
the time of the commission of the tort and is, at the time of the
tortious act, wholly serving his own purpose.
39
It is possible that this liberalization could reach the point decided
in an older case which rather prematurely held the master liable for
the wilful tort of a servant-driver. The court held that any malice or
animosity of the servant would not only fail to protect the master
against liability, but could actually be considered to increase the dam-
ages awarded.40
The end result of these decisions and changing attitudes has not
resulted in a new rule of law. The doctrine of respondeat superior is
still stated by the courts as subjecting the master to liability for any
tortious acts of his servants committed within the scope of their em-
ployment. The liberalization has come in the application of the scope
of employment requirement. The requirement is admittedly not suscepi-
ble of clear and concise definition being perhaps best defined as "what-
ever is done by the employee by virtue of his employment and in
furtherance of its ends."' 41 It has been stated that in doubtful cases
the question of whether the servant was within the scope of his em-
ployment will be resolved against the master, since he is responsible
for setting the force in motion.
42
Some courts have held that the intent of the servant in his per-
formance of the act is determinative of whether the act is within the
scope of employment.4 3 This appears contrary to the well-settled
general rule that the intention of the servant has no effect as to
whether the tortious act itself was done within the scope of employ-
ment.4 4 The intent of the servant could prove useful in doubtful cases
in helping to determine whether a particular act was within the scope
of employment.45 This would be logical when one considers that the
policy of the law subjects a master to liability as a business risk. The
liability is based upon the relationship or the business rather than the
particular acts. Therefore, since the effect upon the third person
remains the same regardless of the servant's intent, the intent should
not be determinative of the master's liability.
Wisconsin has followed the general rule, but has refused to over-
liberalize the construction of the scope of employment requirement.
38 Fields v. Sanders, 29 C.2d 834, 180 P.2d 684 (1947).
39 35 Am. JuR., MASTER AND SERVANT, §556.
40 Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518, 19 Am.Rep. 383 (1874).
4139 C. J., MASTER AND SERVANT, §1472.
42 Robards v. P. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co., 130 Ky. 380, 113 S.W. 429 (1908).
43Hoffman v. Roehl, 61 Mont. 290, 203 Pac. 349 (1921).
44 Craker v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am.Rep. 504 (1875).
45 Colley v. Lewis, 7 Ala. App. 593, 61 So. 37 (1913).
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In the Rogahn case,46 a complaint was allowed to stand which alleged
that the defendant's foreman, who was authorized to hire and dis-
charge employees, had maliciously assaulted the plaintiff in the course
of discharging him from his duties. The Court recognized the doctrine
of respondeat superior, and held that the act of the foreman was
within the scope of his employment because authorized. The Court
stated that, if the use of force was authorized, the fact that excessive
force was used would not destroy the authorization. Thus, although
the doctrine was stated, the case seems actually to have been decided
on the grounds of implied authority. In another case, the Court allowed
recovery to a plaintiff assaulted by the defendant's bartender. The
bartender claimed that the plaintiff had insulted him and that he had
no thought of furthering his master's business at the moment of the
tortious act. The Court held that the collection of money, for drinks
served, was within the scope of employment and the use of excessive
force or the presence of a malicious intent did not obviate the master's
liability. 7
In the Gerstein case," the defendant's employee assaulted the
plaintiff while repossessing a clock after the plaintiff had defaulted on
her installment payments. The Court allowed recovery; and, although
finding no express or implied authority to use force, held that the act
was clearly within the scope of employment. The decision, therefore,
seems to be directly based on respondeat superior, although the doctrine
was not specifically mentioned. In the Mandel case,4 9 the plaintiff
claimed damages as a result of an assault by the defendant's rate clerk.
The evidence tended to show that a rate dispute was followed by in-
sults by the servant and plaintiff after which the alleged assault oc-
curred. The Court held that the assault, although commencing within
the scope of employment, was purely personal. The Court considered
that the insults constituted a stepping aside. The case was reversed
and a new trial ordered on the grounds that the question of scope of
employment should have been submitted to the jury. This decision
marks a point of departure from the liberal trend of the previous
cases. It will be remembered that modem cases hold that recovery
is allowed as a matter of law if the assault grew out of a dispute
which in turn arose out of the employment.50 In the Linden case, the
Court was confronted with an assault by a cab driver on a porter who
carried the luggage of a passenger to a cab belonging to another
company. The Court held that a demurrer to the complaint should
46 Rogahn v. Moore Mfg., etc., Co., 79 Wis. 573, 48 N.W. 669 (1891).
4 Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900).
48 Gerstein v. C. F. Adams Co., 169 Wis. 504, 173 N.W. 209 (1919).
9 Mandel v. Byram, 191 Wis. 446, 211 N.W. 145 (1926).
50 Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. v. Bryeans, 137 Ark. 341, 209 S.W. 69 (1919);
Tri-State Coach Co. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948).
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have been sustained, on the grounds that the assault was a complete
stepping aside from the scope of employment.5 1 This decision follows
logically from that in the Mandel case, since in this case the dispute
itself did not arise from the employment. Since the Mandel case
disallowed recovery when the dispute arose from the employment,
it seems consistent to allow no recovery for a dispute arising independ-
ently of the employment. In conclusion, it seems that Wisconsin still
requires that the act be actually within the scope of employment in
order to render the master subject to liability.
The writer is in accord with the Wisconsin position. Although the
liberalized attitude evidenced in recent decisions might seem to reach
more equitable results in particular fact situations, the resulting trend
appears to have dangerous implications. Modern courts have recog-
nized the unenviable position in which a plaintiff finds himself when
forced to depend upon the assets of a poor man for the satisfaction
of his judgment. From this recognition, the philosophy that the loss
should fall upon those most able to meet it has evolved. Although
this is equitable, its application should be restricted to losses which
are reasonable. It is important to realize that any unnecessary loss to
business will be ultimately reflected on the general public. It then
follows that the public as a whole is forced to compensate each indi-
vidual for his losses. Although this result may seem theoretically de-
sirable, it does not appear conducive to the success of a society based
upon free enterprise.
It is good public policy to hold that each business should be subject
to liability for the risks which normally follow therefrom. This is
well stated by the American Law Institute:
". .. the ultimate question is whether it is just that the loss
resulting from the servant's act should be considered one of the
normal risks of the business which that business should bear."
52
The nature of the act, intentional or negligent, should be immaterial
except as evidence of whether the act was done in the scope of em-
ployment. The purpose of the doctrine of respondeat superior is, as
stated, to render the business liable for its own risks. The courts
should not create new risks which seem entirely independent of the
business by an over-liberalized interpretation of the scope of employ-
ment requirement which is necessary in order for the doctrine to
operate.
ALLAN W. LEISER
51 Linden v. City Cab Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941).5 2 REsT. AGENCY, EXPLAN. NoTEs, W40 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1930); leading to
1 REST. AGENCY, §214.
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